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The Relationship between Jurisdiction 
and Attribution after Jaloud v 
Netherlands 
Abstract 
This paper argues that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Jaloud v 
Netherlands adopted an attribution test in order to establish jurisdiction under Article 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. It argues that this would not be the first time that the 
ECtHR has adopted an attribution test in order to establish Article 1 jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the paper challenges the proposition that the ECtHR’s adoption of an attribution 
test to establish jurisdiction is methodologically unsound and not in conformity with 
international law. It proposes moving beyond this debate and considering the real challenges 
that an attribution test of Article 1 jurisdiction poses for the future.  
Key words: Jaloud v Netherlands; Extraterritoriality; State Responsibility; Fragmentation of 
International Law; Military Intervention. 
1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between jurisdiction and attribution in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(ECtHR) approach to the extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) has been the subject of much speculation.
1
  Article 1 of the ECHR provides 
that a state must secure to everyone ‘within its jurisdiction’ rights under the ECHR. The 
ECtHR has interpreted Article 1 as providing grounds for when a state’s obligations under the 
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ECHR extends outside of its territory. Al Skeini v United Kingdom confirmed that a state will 
have extraterritorial jurisdiction when a state exercises control over a territory
2
 or when a 
state exercises authority and control over an individual.
3
 However, there is much speculation 
as to whether an attribution test for establishing Article 1 jurisdiction also exists in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  
The decision of Jaloud v Netherlands has recently provoked renewed interest in the 
question.
4
 Various interpretations of the ECtHR’s approach in articulating the relationship 
between attribution and jurisdiction have been put forward. One interpretation is that the 
ECtHR has kept separate the question of jurisdiction from attribution: an attribution test 
precedes the jurisdiction question and another attribution test succeeds the jurisdiction 
question.
5
 Another interpretation of Jaloud v Netherlands is that while the ECtHR has 
ensured that the jurisdiction test remains separate from a test of attribution, the preceding and 
succeeding attribution tests have been conflated.
6
 This paper seeks to identify the approach 
the ECtHR took in Jaloud v Netherlands. It also seeks to revisit and challenge some of the 
propositions made regarding the relationship between Article 1 jurisdiction and attribution. It 
proposes that the ECtHR conflated the concepts of jurisdiction and attribution in Jaloud v 
Netherlands. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the ECtHR has adopted an attribution test to 
establish jurisdiction under Article 1 in previous decisions. Finally, it challenges the idea that 
the adoption of an attribution test as a test of jurisdiction by the ECtHR would be 
methodologically unsound and contrary to international law on state responsibility. 
An ‘attribution’ test determines who should be held responsible for a rights violation rather 
than whether a state’s obligations are engaged extraterritorially in the first place. An 
attribution test is normally applied when a variety of actors are involved in the relevant 
events and it is not obvious which actors in the context should be held responsible for a rights 
violation. In this context, an attribution test may be applied to the exclusion of the application 
of the two traditional jurisdiction tests confirmed in Al Skeini: control over an individual and 
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control over a territory. Unlike the state agent authority and control test, an attribution test 
does not aim to establish whether the state agent exercised a particular kind of control over 
the individual such as ‘physical force’7 or ‘custody’8 in order to trigger the application of the 
ECHR extraterritorially. Unlike the control over a territory test, an attribution test does not 
aim to establish whether there is sufficient military presence for a sufficient period of time
9
 to 
establish jurisdiction or whether a particular space, such as a prison or boat constitutes a 
‘territory’ for the purposes of that test.10 Distinguishing an attribution test from a jurisdiction 
test when interpreting the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can be a matter of emphasis. The main 
difference in emphasis is that an attribution test is concerned with determining who should be 
held responsible rather than whether the ECHR is applicable abroad.  In this way, an 
attribution test signals a lack of concern by the ECtHR that the actions took place abroad. The 
arbitrary delimitation on the extraterritorial application of the ECHR provided by the two 
jurisdiction tests confirmed in Al Skeini is no longer applicable. That territory does not 
constitute a barrier to accountability under the ECtHR in cases where an attribution test is 
applied instead of the traditional jurisdiction tests, may account for the lack of 
acknowledgment of conflation of attribution with jurisdiction by the ECtHR.  
Firstly, this paper will provide an analysis of the reasoning in Jaloud v Netherlands. It 
attempts to de-mystify the ECtHR’s judgment, putting forward an interpretation of the 
ECtHR’s reasoning that provides that the ECtHR conflated the concepts of jurisdiction and 
attribution. Secondly, the paper argues that Jaloud is not the first case in which the ECtHR 
has adopted an attribution test to establish jurisdiction under Article 1. It will be argued that 
an attribution test was used to determine whether a state had jurisdiction in relation to the 
‘effective control’ test. It illustrates that there were two sub-tests of ‘effective control’ applied 
by the ECtHR: a ‘control over the territory’ test, and an ‘attribution’ test. This proposition is 
in contrast to the assertion that there was mere conceptual confusion between the two 
concepts in the ECtHR’s case law.11 The ‘control over the territory’ sub-test provides that 
Article 1 jurisdiction will be established when a state exercises control over a territory, and 
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the ‘attribution’ sub-test provides that it will be established when the state exercises a degree 
of control over entities carrying out the rights-violation. The precise nature and standard of 
control in each instance will be explored in an analysis of the relevant cases. In its application 
of the ‘attribution’ sub-test the ECtHR failed to acknowledge that it conflated jurisdiction and 
attribution. However, this does not preclude the argument that the ECtHR does in fact apply 
an attribution test to establish jurisdiction in these circumstances: commentators openly 
acknowledge that the ECtHR’s cognisance of its own practices in relation to its treatment of 
jurisdiction and attribution is not indicative of its actual approach.
12
  
Thirdly, the paper challenges the proposition that the ECtHR’s adoption of an attribution test 
to establish Article 1 jurisdiction would be methodologically unsound and not in conformity 
with international law on state responsibility. It has been argued, firstly, that the conceptual 
framework of Article 2 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State 
Responsibility (ASR)
13
 indicates that attribution and Article 1 jurisdiction are separate 
questions;
14
 and secondly, in cases where the ECtHR purportedly adopts an attribution test to 
establish jurisdiction, those attribution tests are not in conformity with the attribution test 
prescribed by the ASR and case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
15
 It will be 
argued in response to the first proposition that the conceptual framework of the ASR appears 
to have nothing to say about the relationship between jurisdiction under international human 
rights treaties and attribution under the law of state responsibility, and therefore does not 
offer any methodological guidance on the relationship between the two concepts. In response 
to the second proposition it will be argued that the ECtHR, in conformity with international 
law, could justify a different attribution test to that stipulated by the ICJ and the ASR.  
Jaloud v Netherlands has provided a new opportunity to clarify the relationship between 
Article 1 jurisdiction and attribution in the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality case law, and to revisit 
arguments for and against the availability of an attribution test to establish jurisdiction. This 
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paper seeks to illustrate the fact that the ECtHR has in fact used an attribution test to establish 
jurisdiction in previous cases. It then seeks to evaluate whether this is desirable or not. It 
addresses and answers old challenges against an attribution test for establishing Article 1 
jurisdiction, with the intention of allowing the real concerns relating to conflating attribution 
and jurisdiction to come to the fore. 
 
2. Jaloud v Netherlands 
 
2.1 The Facts and ECtHR’s Assessment 
 
In Jaloud v Netherlands, an unknown car approached a vehicle checkpoint in South Eastern 
Iraq.
16
 From inside the car shots were fired at the personnel guarding the checkpoint, all of 
them members of the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). The guards returned fire. No one 
was hit and the car drove off.
17
 The checkpoint commander called on a patrol of six 
Netherlands soldiers led by a Lieutenant.
18
 Another car approached the checkpoint at speed, 
hitting one of the barrels which formed part of the checkpoint. Shots were fired at the car by 
the Netherlands Lieutenant. It was not clear whether any of the ICDC had fired shots.
19
 The 
applicant’s son, Azhar Sabah Jaloud, who was in the car at the time had died from the 
gunshots fired.
20
 The applicant brought a case to the ECtHR claiming that the Netherlands 
had breached the procedural duty under Article 2 right to life to carry out an effective and 
independent investigation into the death of his son. The ECtHR found that the Netherlands 
had jurisdiction under Article 1 and that, despite allowances made for the difficult 
circumstances under which they were undertaking their work, the Netherlands failed to 
provide an effective investigation under Article 2.
21
  
The Netherlands argued that the events complained of did not fall within the ‘jurisdiction’ of 
the Netherlands within the meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR as it was not an ‘occupying 
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power’ under International Humanitarian Law and that only the US and UK were occupying 
powers by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483.
22
 Furthermore, they had not 
assumed any public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government.
23
 Instead 
the Netherland’s contingent was under the ‘operational control of the commander of the 
Multinational Division, South East (MND (SE))’, a UK officer.24 The Netherlands 
distinguished the present case from Al Skeini v United Kingdom,
25
 wherein the UK had 
jurisdiction because the deaths had occurred as a result of actions of UK soldiers in the course 
of security operations whereas the death of Azhar Sabah Jaloud had occurred at a checkpoint 
manned by the ICDC. Although Netherlands personnel were present, there did not exist a 
‘hierarchical relationship’ such that the Netherlands was responsible for what happened.26 
Finally, the Netherlands argued that they should not be found to have exercised effective 
control over the checkpoint as this geographical area was so small that it would mean there 
would be no meaningful difference between the ‘control over a territory’ and ‘control over an 
individual’ tests of jurisdiction. 
The applicant argued that the Netherlands had jurisdiction as, through their servicemen over 
which they officially exercised full command,
27
 it exercised public powers including 
enforcement of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s authority and a security role.28 The 
Netherlands was exercising this public power when they were overseeing the ICDC at the 
checkpoint.
29
 The Netherlands also had jurisdiction by virtue of its effective military control 
over the area and additionally by virtue of the fact that it was an ‘occupying power’ within 
the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Rules.
30
 Furthermore, the Netherlands had authority 
and control of the checkpoint including the Iraqi personnel manning it, and had carried out 
the investigation into Jaloud’s death.31 Finally, the Netherlands Minister of Defence in his 
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letter to Parliament of 18 June 2007 had endorsed the conclusion of the report of the Van den 
Berg Committee that the ECHR applied to Netherlands troops in Iraq.
32
 
Under the question of ‘jurisdiction’ the ECtHR recited its own case law on Article 1 
jurisdiction including Al Skeini
33
 which asserts the two main categories of Article 1 
jurisdiction: effective control over a territory and state agent authority and control.
34
 It found 
that whether a state was the ‘occupying power’ was not determinative of Article 1 
jurisdiction.
35
 Under the same category of ‘jurisdiction’ the ECtHR then addressed to whom 
actions should be attributed. Agreeing with the applicants, the ECtHR stated that the 
respondent state was: 
 …not divested of its “jurisdiction”, within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention, solely by dint of having accepted the operational control of the 
commander of the MND (SE), a United Kingdom officer. The Court notes that the 
Netherlands retained “full command” over its military personnel, as the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and of Defence pointed out in their letter to Parliament (see para 57 
above).
36
 
The ECtHR continued to answer to whom action should be attributed under the ‘jurisdiction’ 
heading: 
The practical elaboration of the multinational force was shaped by a network of 
Memoranda of Understanding defining the interrelations between the various armed 
contingents present in Iraq. The letter sent to the Lower House of Parliament on 6 
June 2003 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence (see paragraph 57 above) 
emphasises that the Netherlands Government retained full command over the 
Netherlands contingent in Iraq.
37
  
It concluded that it appeared from the relevant sources that the drawing up of distinct rules on 
the use of force ‘remained the reserved domain of individual sending states’.38 For this 
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reason, the ‘Netherlands assumed responsibility for providing security in that area, to the 
exclusion of other participating States, and retained full command over its contingents 
there’.39 It did not matter that the checkpoint was nominally manned by the ICDC because 
they were subordinate to the Coalition Forces.
40
 The Netherlands was not placed “at the 
disposal” of, or “under the exclusive direction or control” of any other State, referring to 
Article 6 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility and the Bosnian Genocide case.
41
  
Under the separate heading of ‘attribution’, and following the above analysis, the ECtHR 
stated that ‘“jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has never been equated with the 
test for establishing a State’s responsibility of an internationally wrongful act under general 
international law (see Catan, cited above, para 115).’42 It invoked Al Skeini to state that the 
Convention rights could be ‘divided and tailored’43 and concluded its analysis of attribution 
by stating that: 
The facts giving rise to the applicant’s complaints derive from alleged acts and 
omissions of Netherlands military personnel and investigative and judicial authorities. 
As such they are capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the Netherlands under 
the Convention.
44
 
The ECtHR proceeded to adjudicate upon whether there had been a breach of the 
investigative duty under Article 2. The ECtHR found that the Netherlands had carried out an 
independent investigation.
45
 However, the Netherlands had failed to carry out an effective 
investigation because important information had been withheld from judicial authorities and 
the applicant; no precautions had been taken to prevent the accused Lieutenant from 
‘colluding’ with other witnesses before he was questioned; the autopsy was not carried out to 
the standard required; and important material evidence, including the bullet fragments taken 
from the victim’s body, were mislaid.46 
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2.2 A Conflation of Jurisdiction and Attribution 
 
Marko Milanovic argues that Jaloud confirms the already existing approach of the ECtHR 
entailing two different kinds of attribution tests related but separate from the concept of 
jurisdiction: one preceding the application of the jurisdiction test (attribution of jurisdiction-
establishing conduct) and one following the application of the jurisdiction test (attribution of 
violation-establishing conduct).
47
 Jurisdiction-establishing conduct is the conduct (act or 
omission) which gives rise to the control over the territory or control over the individual, the 
two tests for establishing jurisdiction. Violation-establishing conduct is the act or omission 
which gives rise to the violation of the right. The preceding attribution test establishes who 
carried out the jurisdiction-establishing conduct and the succeeding attribution test establishes 
who carried out the violation.   
 
Milanovic argues that the ECtHR resolved the attribution of jurisdiction question when it 
found that the Netherlands troops were not placed ‘“at the disposal” of any foreign power’;48 
the ECtHR addressed the separate ‘jurisdiction’ question when it stated that ‘the respondent 
Party exercised its ‘jurisdiction’ within the limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose of 
asserting authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint’;49 attribution of 
the actual alleged violations was addressed under the separate heading of ‘attribution’ when 
the ECtHR stated that ‘[T]he facts giving rise to the applicant’s complaints derive[d] from 
alleged acts and omissions of Netherlands’ and were therefore capable of giving rise to the 
responsibility of the Netherlands’.50 
However, it is difficult to see how this reading can withstand scrutiny. The ‘jurisdiction’ 
section (from paras 140-151 at the very least) is concerned with demonstrating that the 
Netherlands, rather than the occupying powers (the US and UK) or the IDRC manning the 
checkpoint, should be held responsible for the death of Azhar Sabah Jaloud. The ECtHR 
states that being an occupying power is not determinative of jurisdiction;
51
 executing a 
decision or an order given by the authority of a foreign State is not determinative of 
                                                          
47
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jurisdiction;
52
 and the fact that the checkpoint is nominally manned by the Iraqi ICDC is not 
determinative of jurisdiction.
53
 What was important for establishing jurisdiction was that the 
Netherlands had ‘retained full command’.54  ‘Full command’ was the test that the ECtHR 
applied which attributed the actions to the Netherlands, and not to the ICDC or the UK and 
US.  
In terms of para 152, which Milanovic believes to be a paragraph separately resolving the 
question of Article 1 jurisdiction, the ECtHR states that Jaloud was killed while ‘passing 
through a checkpoint manned by personnel under the command and direct supervision of a 
Netherlands Royal Army Officer’. This more closely resembles an attribution test rather than 
a control over the territory or authority and control over an individual test as the statement 
aims to establish which actor had the requisite control over the checkpoint rather than aiming 
to determine whether the type of control exercised over the individual was sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction over that individual. Furthermore, no Article 1 jurisdiction case law was 
cited in support of either test. The ECtHR further states that it ‘exercised its “jurisdiction” 
within the limits of its SFIR mission’.55 Again, this sentence appears to be corroborating 
earlier statements that it was within the Netherland’s mandate to be in ‘full command’ of the 
events at the checkpoint. Although the ECtHR states that the Netherlands ‘asserted authority 
and control’ while ‘exercising its “jurisdiction” within the limits of its SFIR mission’56 this 
appears to be a rhetorical flourish rather than an assertion that it based its finding of 
jurisdiction on a ‘state agent authority and control’ test.  
It does not appear that the ‘attribution’ section separately establishes whether there has been 
attribution of wrongful conduct, separate from the questions of both attributing jurisdiction 
and establishing jurisdiction, as is asserted by both Milanovic and Aurel Sari.
57
 There is no 
further analysis of whether any other actions should be attributed to the Netherlands, only the 
assertion that the ECtHR does not conflate jurisdiction with attribution.
58
 Aurel Sari, like 
Milanovic, maintains that this section indicates a separate test for attributing wrongful 
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conduct. However, he argues that the ‘full command’ test - that was appropriately used to 
determine attribution of jurisdiction - was inappropriately applied in the ‘attribution’ section 
to determine attribution of wrongful conduct instead of the law of state responsibility.
59
 He 
argues that the ‘full command’ test was applied by default in determining the attribution of 
wrongful conduct because of the lack of any further analysis under this section.
60
  This paper 
argues that there was no further analysis because the ECtHR had already answered to whom 
the wrongful conduct should be attributed under the jurisdiction heading. Sari argues that the 
ECtHR determined Article 1 jurisdiction separately from determining attribution of 
jurisdiction and attribution of the wrongful conduct. He argues that the ECtHR established 
jurisdiction from three factors: assumption of authority by the Netherlands over the area, 
authority over the ICRD at the checkpoint, and the nature of the checkpoint as an instrument 
for asserting control over persons passing through it.
61
 However, the first two factors where 
arrived at through an attribution analysis. Furthermore, the checkpoint was not identified as a 
particular space which could constitute ‘territory’ for the purposes of the control over the 
territory test or as a method of control for exercising state agent authority and control over 
individuals. Rather, the point of emphasis was on which actor exercised control over the 
checkpoint where the shooting took place.  
It appears that the ECtHR applied one test, one attribution test establishing to whom the 
rights-violating conduct should be attributed in the particular context, rather than three tests, 
before moving to the adjudication of the substantive right. 
3. Two Distinct sub-tests of ‘effective control’ 
 
Does the conflation of attribution and Article 1 jurisdiction represent a new approach by the 
ECtHR? It will be argued here that this is not the first time that the ECtHR has conflated and 
denied conflating a test of attribution with Article 1 jurisdiction. It will be illustrated that the 
ECtHR has conflated attribution and Article 1 jurisdiction in the context of the ‘effective 
control’ test first articulated in Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections).62  This case arose 
in the context of Turkish military operations in northern Cyprus in July and August 1974 
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which led to the subsequent division of Cyprus and to the establishment of a separatist 
regime, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In Loizidou, the applicant 
complained that the Turkish armed forces had prevented her from returning to northern 
Cyprus after the occupation and peacefully enjoying her property in the occupied area. In 
order to determine whether Turkey had obligations under the ECHR with respect to the 
applicant, the ECtHR found that: 
...the responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of 
military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective control of an area 
outside its national territory. The obligation to secure in such an area, the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it be 
exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.
63
 
This test was interpreted in two ways both in the literature and in the case law that followed. 
One interpretation was that as a result of the control exercised by the respondent state over 
the territory, the respondent state had obligations under the ECHR towards everyone within 
that territory both to protect rights and to prevent rights violations by other individuals (the 
‘control over the territory’ test).64 Another interpretation was that the rights violations carried 
out by the subordinate local administration could be attributed to the respondent state because 
of the control the respondent state exercised over the subordinate local administration 
(attribution test).
65
 Milanovic explains the ‘control over the territory’ test by reference to 
positive obligations. The positive obligations explanation provides that the respondent state, 
                                                          
63
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Court of Human Rights’ (2003) EJIL 545; Monica Hakimi, ‘State bystander responsibility’ (2010) EJIL 377.  
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when it exercises control over the territory, must take positive actions to prevent others from 
committing rights violations within that territory.
66
 Milanovic posits that the ECtHR in 
Loizidou (preliminary objections)
67
 established that Turkey, by virtue of its effective overall 
control over northern Cyprus, had a positive obligation to prevent human rights violations, 
regardless of by whom they were committed.
68
 
It is ambiguous as to which reading was applied by the ECtHR to the facts of Loizidou 
(preliminary objections) itself. After citing the effective control test above, the ECtHR stated 
that ‘the applicant’s loss of her property stemmed from the occupation of the northern part of 
Cyprus by Turkish troops and the establishment of the TRNC…’69 This statement could be 
interpreted as suggesting that it was the Turkish occupation of the territory (control over the 
territory) or Turkey’s establishment of the TRNC (attribution test) that was decisive for 
establishing jurisdiction. On an adjudication of the merits in Loizidou it was obvious from the 
‘large number of troops’ in Northern Cyprus that Turkey exercised ‘effective overall control’ 
thus entailing ‘detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities’ of the 
“TRNC”’. 70 In the merits, therefore, it was still ambiguous as to whether the ECtHR applied 
a control over the territory or attribution test. Cyprus v Turkey
71
 is also ambiguous. What was 
decisive in that case was whether ‘Turkey actually exercised detailed control over the policies 
and actions of the authorities of the “TRNC”’ but the judges placed emphasis on the 
‘effective overall control’ of the territory as enabling Turkey to exercise control over that part 
of the territory.
72
 Turkey was responsible for ‘the acts of the local administration which 
survive[d] by virtue of Turkish military and other support’.73 
In subsequent cases the Loizidou test is interpreted by the ECtHR as either a respondent’s 
control over the territory test or as an attribution test. In Ilascu v Moldova and Russia
74
 and 
Catan v Moldova and Russia
75
 the ECtHR appears to have adopted an attribution test and in, 
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for example, Bankovic v Belgium
76
 and Saddam Hussein v Albania
77
 the ECtHR applied the 
control over the territory test.  
Both Ilascu and Catan concerned rights violations carried out by the Moldovan Republic of 
Transdniestria. Following the declaration of the Republic of Moldova in June 1990, the 14
th
 
Army aided Transdniestrian separatists to set up the Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria in 
September 1990.
78
 In Ilascu, Russia was found to have violated Article 3 (right against 
torture and inhumane and degrading treatment and punishment) and Article 5 (right to liberty 
and security) with regards to all of the applicants concerned from the date of its ratification of 
the Convention.
79
 The judgment was focused predominantly upon establishing links between 
Russia and the MRT itself which included its historical links: during the Moldovan conflict in 
1991-1992, forces of the 14
th
 Army stationed in Transdniestria fought with and on behalf of 
the Transdniestrian separatist forces;
80
 throughout ‘clashes between the Moldovan authorities 
and the Transdniestrian separatists, the leaders of the Russian Federation supported the 
separatist authorities by their political declarations’;81 Russia had provided the separatists 
with large quantities of weapons;
82
 separatists had seized possession of other weapons 
unopposed by Russian soldiers.
83
 In terms of the present day connections between Russia and 
the MRT, the Court attached particular importance to the fact that the MRT enjoyed financial 
support from the Russian Federation.
84
 The Russian Federation cleared the MRT’s debt to it, 
supplied gas to Transdniestria on better financial terms than to Moldova, and state-controlled 
companies of the Russian Federation entered into commercial relations with companies in the 
MRT.
85
 The fact that Russia helped to install the MRT with military aid, and enabled its 
survival with financial aid, were crucial to holding Russia responsible for the acts of the 
MRT. The point of emphasis was whether there was sufficient control or influence exercised 
by Russia over the MRT rather than sufficient control over the territory. The Court noted that 
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after the ceasefire the ‘Russian Federation continued to provide military, political and 
economic support to the separatist regime (see paragraphs 111 - 61 above), thus enabling it to 
survive by strengthening itself and by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-vis 
Moldova’.86 The ECtHR did not use a positive obligations explanation to explain Russia’s 
extraterritorial obligations under the ECHR despite the fact that it used positive obligations to 
explain the obligations of Moldova—the territorial state on which the separatist regime was 
situated.
87
 If the ECtHR had intended to use a positive obligations explanation in relation to 
Russia’s extraterritorial obligations, it had created an opening for doing so. The fact that it 
did not is further evidence for suggesting that an attribution test was applied in this case.  
In Catan the ECtHR went into much greater detail concerning both the historical and 
contemporary links between Russia and the MRT.
88
 It repeated the factors that it had 
considered crucial in Ilascu
89
 and also added more specific considerations. For example, it 
noted that in April 1992, the Russian Army stationed in Transdniestria intervened in the 
conflict allowing the separatists to gain possession of Tighnia.
90
 The Russian public 
corporation Gazprom supplied gas to the region and the MRT paid for only a tiny fraction of 
the gas consumed.
91
 Furthermore, the Russian Government had spent millions of US dollars 
every year in the form of humanitarian aid to the population of Transdniestria, including the 
payment of old age pensions, financial assistance to schools, hospitals and prisons.
92
 This was 
even more significant considering the fact that only 20% of the MRT population was 
economically active.
93
 It appears the ECtHR attempted to demonstrate the control and 
influence that Russia had on the MRT in order to attribute the actions of the MRT to Russia. 
In contrast to Ilascu and Catan which appeared to apply an attribution test, the cases of 
Banković v Belgium94 and Saddam Hussein v Albania95 applied a control over the territory 
test. Banković concerned airstrikes carried out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
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(‘NATO’) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the conflict in 
Kosovo between Serbian and Kosovar Albanian forces during 1998 and 1999. A Radio 
TelevizijeSrbije (‘RTS’) building was hit by a missile launched from a NATO forces’ 
aircraft. The ECtHR invoked the public international law definition of jurisdiction in order to 
determine the ‘ordinary meaning’ of jurisdiction within Article 1 as was required by the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation reflected in  Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969. Aside from specific factual incidences in which the ECHR 
could be applied abroad,
96
 the ECtHR provided that the ECHR would apply extraterritorially 
only in ‘exceptional’ circumstances, when ‘through the effective control of the relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the 
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory’ the respondent state 
‘exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government’.97 
In applying this test, the ECtHR expressly asserted that ‘the scope of Article 1…is 
determinative of the very scope of the Contracting Parties’ positive obligations and, as such, 
of the scope and reach of the entire Convention system’.98 It rejected a ‘cause-and-effect’ 
notion of jurisdiction meaning that it rejected the idea that a state could be held responsible 
for a specific, singular incident of rights-violation abroad, but would rather be held 
responsible under the entire breadth of the ECHR towards everyone within that territory.
99
 In 
this way rights under the ECHR could not be ‘divided and tailored’.100 The ECtHR found in 
that case that the NATO states carrying out the bombing did not exercise sufficient ‘control 
over the territory’ to establish Article 1 jurisdiction because there had been no military 
occupation and no exercise of public powers. 
Saddam Hussein v Albania also adopted the ‘control of the territory’ test.101 The Hussein case 
arose as a result of the invasion by the US and UK in Iraq. The former President of Iraq, 
Saddam Hussein complained that as a result of his ‘arrest, detention, handover and ongoing 
trial’ the states involved were in violation of Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (right against 
torture and inhumane and degrading treatment), Article 5 (right to liberty and security) and 
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Article 6 right to a fair trial, as well as Article 1 of the 6
th
 and 13
th
 Protocols. Without any 
thorough analysis of the nature of the control exercised by any of the states over the territory 
of Iraq, the ECtHR concluded that Hussein had not demonstrated that any of the states had 
‘control of the territory where the alleged violations took place’ citing Loizidou v Turkey and 
Cyprus v Turkey.
102
  
It appears that the test in Loizidou (preliminary objections) is ambiguous and can be 
interpreted to mean an attribution or control over the territory test: perhaps Turkey had 
responsibility under the ECHR in Northern Cyprus because of its control over the TRNC or 
because of its control over the territory in Northern Cyprus. However, it is clear in Ilascu and 
Catan that the ECtHR focused on establishing a control link between the respondent state and 
the separatist regime, the MRT, rather than control over the territory; and Banković and 
Hussein both explicitly applied the control over the territory approach.  
4. Unsound Methodology and Conflicts with International Law 
4.1 Unsound Methodology 
 
It has been argued that attribution should not be conflated with Article 1 jurisdiction because 
the law of state responsibility is a separate issue from jurisdiction under international human 
rights treaties.
103
 Gondek states that it is not methodologically correct to conflate attribution 
and jurisdiction under human rights treaties.
104
 He finds that the rules of state responsibility 
deal only with determining whether an ‘obligation has been violated and what should be the 
consequences of the violation’, rather than with ‘defining the rule and the content of the 
obligation it imposes’, citing the ILC Rapporteur Roberto Ago.105  Rules of state 
responsibility are ‘secondary’ providing ‘the general conditions under international law for 
the state to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal 
consequences flowing therefrom’.106 Primary rules define the content of the international 
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legal obligation breached.
107
 Gondek distinguishes state responsibility from jurisdiction: 
‘[t]he issue whether a person is within the jurisdiction of a state within the meaning of human 
rights treaties is not a question of attributability of an act to a state, which belongs to 
secondary rules of state responsibility.
108
  
 
Article 2 states that there is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the state under international law (Article 
2(a)) and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State (Article 2(b)).
109
 Both 
Gondek
110
 and Milanovic
111
 provide that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the ECHR establishes 
whether there has been a breach of obligations as they determine to whom substantive 
obligations are owed, therefore falling under Article 2(b) of ASR. Sarah H Cleveland, 
however, argues that jurisdiction in international human rights treaties is closely linked to the 
international law concept of state responsibility: ‘it is the exercise of jurisdiction that gives 
rise to legal obligations under the treaty’.112 She cites tests of state responsibility and 
attribution applied in ICJ case law which determine whether treaty obligations arise to 
elucidate the concept of jurisdiction in international human rights treaties.
113
 Olivier De 
Schutter argues that the question of jurisdiction under international human rights treaties 
‘precedes’ the two questions in Article 2.114 It is the preliminary threshold question before 
any questions of state responsibility.
115
 
                                                          
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Article 2 states: ‘There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the State.’ 
110
 Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World (n 1) 168. 
111
 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 273. 
112
 Sarah H Cleveland, ‘Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad’, (2010) Vol 110(2) Colum L 
Rev 225, 233.  
113
 Ibid 233-4 citing Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits), 
Judgment of 27 June 1986 paras 105-115. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007 
paras 391- 406; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ 16 (June 
21). 
114
 Olivier De Schutter, ‘Globalisation and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2006) 6 Baltic YB Int’l L 185, 189. 
19 
 
 
Contrary to Gondek and Milanovic, jurisdiction does not appear to be determinative of 
whether an action or omission ‘constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state’ 
and is not determinative of the definition or the ‘content’ of an ECHR obligation.116 It 
establishes whether the ECHR is in operation at all when the state is acting abroad. The 
content of an ECHR obligation and whether there has been a breach of a right under the 
ECHR is determined by an adjudication upon the merits. Cleveland acknowledges that 
jurisdiction is a separate question from establishing whether there has been a breach of an 
international obligation. The function of jurisdiction – establishing whether a treaty 
obligation is in operation at all - is much more closely aligned to state responsibility. What is 
important to acknowledge is that there is no consensus on what Article 2 of the ASR has to 
say about the relationship between jurisdiction and state responsibility. The lack of consensus 
on the interpretation of Article 2 may be evidence of the fact that Article 2 does not have 
anything to say about that relationship.
117
 In any case, it cannot be conclusively said that 
Article 2 precludes a conflation of attribution and jurisdiction under international human 
rights treaties. Therefore, it is not necessarily an unsound methodology to conflate attribution 
and jurisdiction under international law. There is even support for the proposition that 
jurisdiction and state responsibility carry out the same function of determining whether legal 
obligations under a treaty arise in the first place.
118
 
 4.2 Conflicts with International Law 
 
In addition to the conceptual debate on the relationship between jurisdiction and state 
responsibility, there is concern that a conflation of attribution and Article 1 jurisdiction would 
unavoidably conflict with standards of attribution under the law of state responsibility 
prescribed by the ICJ and in the ASR.
119
 This has been put forward as a reason for denying 
conflation of attribution and Article 1 jurisdiction. This concern has arisen specifically in the 
context of states’ relationships with separatist groups in other countries, such as in relation to 
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the TRNC and MRT decisions. The same concern has not arisen in the context of 
multinational military operations. The ECtHR has adopted attribution tests that are contrary 
to those prescribed under the ASR and ‘Draft articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations’ in the context of multi-national military operations.120 However, these 
concerns have never been put forward as a reason for denying the conflation of attribution 
with Article 1 jurisdiction. This section addresses a very particular debate that arose in 
relation to two ICJ decisions, Nicaragua and the Bosnian Genocide Case;
121
 one International 
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decision, Tadić;122 and Loizidou v 
Turkey.
123
 It challenges the argument that these cases and relevant articles of the ASR 
demonstrate that attribution cannot be conflated with Article 1 jurisdiction in ECtHR 
jurisprudence. 
The ASR provides the starting point for understanding attribution in international law. Article 
4(1) ASR provides that conduct of a state’s own organs is always attributable to states.124 
Furthermore, acts by a non-state actor performed under the ‘direction, instigation or control 
of state organs’ can also be attributed to the state.125 Attributing the actions of a non-state 
entity to a state does not merely arise from a factual causal link between those actions and the 
state,
126
  but rather is determined by further provisions in the ASR and also in the 
adjudication of cases brought before relevant international courts. Nicaragua, the Bosnian 
Genocide Case and Tadić all provide guidance on how attribution should be understood 
under international law.  
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In Nicaragua the ICJ set out two tests for attributing the actions of a non-state entity - which 
was not a de jure organ of the state - to a state: a test requiring the establishment of control 
over the particular conduct in question (complete dependence) and a test requiring the 
establishment of control over the entity (effective control).
127
 The ICJ aimed to ascertain 
whether the US could be held responsible for violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) carried out by contras in Nicaragua.  The test applied was whether the relationship 
between the contras and the US Government was ‘so much one of dependence on the one 
side and control on the other’ that the contras should be equated with an organ of the state for 
legal purposes.
128
 The ICJ found that apart from the aid that was provided to the contras they 
were otherwise an “independent force”.129 The ICJ asked itself whether the provision of aid 
by the US to the contras was sufficient for declaring the contras to be acting on behalf of the 
US.
130
 It noted that when military aid was ceased contra activity continued.
131
 Therefore, 
although US support was ‘crucial’ to the contra’s conduct, their ‘complete dependence’ on 
US aid was not demonstrated.
132
 Although there was one stage where US support was crucial 
this was not demonstrated in relation to the majority of acts that were carried out.
133
 
Sufficient control was not found despite the fact that ‘political leaders of the contra force had 
been selected, installed and paid by the United States’ and despite their participation in the 
‘organization, training and equipping of the force, the planning of operations, choosing of 
targets and the operational support provided’.134 The ICJ concluded that it did not have 
sufficient evidence to determine the US’s involvement, and did not think that it had been 
clearly demonstrated that the contras had ‘no real autonomy’.135  
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The ICJ then applied another test with a lower threshold of control: ‘effective control of the 
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed’.136 Sufficient control could be established if the US could be found to have 
exercised general ‘effective control’ of the military and paramilitary operations. Therefore, 
Nicaragua indicates that the ICJ will apply a test of ‘complete dependence’ when 
establishing whether a particular activity can be attributed to the respondent state, and a test 
of ‘effective control’ when establishing whether, more generally, the actions of a non-state 
entity can be attributed to the respondent state. Therefore, the standard of control required for 
attribution in Nicaragua was much higher than in the ECtHR decisions in Ilascu or Catan.
137
  
At the ICTY, the Trial Chamber in Tadić chose to determine whether there existed a state of 
international armed conflict by asking whether forces of Bosnian Serbs had remained agents 
of FRY after the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Bosnia in May 1992.
138
 It used the law 
of state responsibility and the tests of control laid down in Nicaragua in order to determine 
whether there was an international armed conflict. The Appeal Chamber of the ICTY 
disagreed with the test of control adopted in Nicaragua. It found that in order for the actions 
of an individual to be attributed to the state, the state had to exercise ‘effective control’ over 
that individual, but it asserted that the degree of control could vary according to the factual 
circumstances of each case.
139
 A single, private individual would need specific instructions 
from the state for their actions to be attributable to the state but a group would require a 
different standard of control for their actions to be attributed to the state.
140
 It was sufficient 
for the group to be under the overall control of the state for attribution to occur. The Appeals 
Chamber found in Tadić that the state coordinating or helping in the general planning of the 
non-state actor’s military activity was sufficient control for attribution of conduct to the 
respondent state.
141
 The Appeal Chamber relied on Loizidou to justify a much lower threshold 
of control required for the attribution test, stating that in that case the ‘Court did not find it 
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necessary to ascertain whether the Turkish authorities had exercised “detailed” control over 
the specific “policies and actions” of the authorities of the “TRNC”’.142 
Article 8 ASR adopted the Nicaragua test as the test of attribution of conduct of non-state 
entities to a state. It attributed to a state conduct by persons or groups of persons acting ‘on 
the instructions’, or ‘under the direction’ or ‘under the control’ of the state. The Commentary 
to Article 8 distinguished Tadić from Nicaragua by stating that the question in Tadić was 
concerned with applicable rules of international law rather than state responsibility.
143
 In the 
Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ rejected the test in Tadić.144 In that case the ICJ had to 
determine whether acts of genocide carried out at Srebrenica in the former Yugoslavia (FRY) 
by Bosnian Serb armed forces (VRS) were attributable to FRY. Having established that 
members of VRS were not de jure organs of FRY and could not be likened to organs of the 
FRY because they did not have ‘complete dependence’ on it,145 it then considered whether 
the VRS could be considered as a de facto organ of FRY. The ICJ applied the ‘effective 
control’ test from Nicaragua.146 It did so because the Nicaragua test coincided with the 
standards required by the ILC in Article 8 ASR.
147
 Similar to the Commentary for Article 8, 
the ICJ rejected Tadić firstly because it did not apply the test to a situation which concerned 
state responsibility but rather in order to determine whether the conflict was international or 
not;
148
 and secondly, it broadened the scope of state responsibility because it went beyond the 
standards set out by the ILC in Article 8 of the ARS.
149
   
The ICJ and ILC’s explicit rejection of Tadić’s adoption of an attribution test based on 
Loizidou has been stated as evidence of the fact that the ECtHR’s Article 1 jurisprudence 
cannot be interpreted as employing an attribution test because it would not be in conformity 
with international law.
150
 International law on state responsibility does not admit of a lower 
standard of control for attributing the actions of a non-state actor to a state. But does the ICJ 
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and ILC’s rejection of Tadić necessarily entail a rejection of a lower standard of control for 
attribution in all other circumstances? Cassese has argued that if the ICTY had stated that it 
was applying a test in order to establish whether the armed conflict was an international one – 
and not necessarily dictating general rules on state responsibility – then that would be 
permissible.
151
 Would a lower standard of control for attribution in the human rights context 
ever be permissible under international law? 
 
The ILC prepared a report on the fragmentation of international law entitled ‘Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’ (the ‘Fragmentation Report’) with Martti Koskenniemi as Chairman.152 
The Fragmentation Report sought to determine whether the emergence of new “self-
contained regimes” such as human rights regimes, trade regimes, environmental regimes as 
well as other geographically or functionally limited treaty regimes ‘created problems of 
coherence in international law’.153 It acknowledged that in conditions of ‘social complexity’ 
it was ‘pointless to insist on formal unity’ of international law.154 However, it also recognised 
the tension that existed between different rules and standards in international law and 
attempted to suggest means of resolving those tensions by using techniques of judicial 
interpretation.
155
 
 
The Fragmentation Report considered the different tests of attribution prescribed in 
Nicaragua and Tadić.156 It found that two types of problems arose from this kind of norm 
conflict: legal subjects would no longer be able to predict the standard which would be 
applied to them and to plan around those standards; and it would put legal subjects in an 
unequal position in relation to each other because their rights, rather than depending on a 
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coherent legal framework, would depend upon which court had jurisdiction to hear the case 
or which forum was chosen by those party to the case.
157
 The two possible solutions it posited 
for solving this kind of conflict was firstly, by states adopting a new law that settled the 
conflict, or secondly, by institutions coordinating the conflict in the future.
158
  
 
The Fragmentation Report provides a number of methods for coordinating conflicting norms. 
Two methods may be of significance for the ECtHR’s adoption of a different attribution test 
to that prescribed by general international law. The ECtHR could distinguish its approach 
from that prescribed by general international law under lex specialis and by virtue of its 
‘regionalist’ character. The principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali provides special 
law derogates from general law and is one of the interpretation techniques recommended by 
the Fragmentation Report for justifying diverging standards from general international law.
159
 
Lex specialis can provide an ‘elaboration, updating or technical specification’ of the general 
standard of a particular rule.
160
 Lex specialis operates upon the principle that ‘special rules 
are better able to take account of particular circumstances’.161 The ILC Commentary to 
Article 55 of the ASR states that ‘[t]hese articles do not apply where and to the extent that the 
conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or 
implementation of the international responsibility of a state are governed by special rules of 
international law’.162 The articles have a ‘residual character’ in relation to the special rules.163 
The ECtHR could therefore argue that it is operating with a lower standard of control for 
attributing action of a non-state entity to a state in order to improve human rights protection.  
 
The Fragmentation Report recognises “regionalism” as the ‘pursuit of geographical 
exceptions to universal international rules’.164 Certain rules are only binding on states that are 
members of a particular region.
165
 It could be argued that the ECHR was an instrument of 
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‘European public order’ in which a unique set of standards applied because of the regional 
character of the ECHR, thus justifying a lower standard of control for establishing attribution 
than that required under general international law.
166
 It follows that the ECtHR is not 
necessarily prohibited under international law from taking a different approach to the ICJ in 
the Bosnian Genocide Case and to Article 8 ASR, so long as the ECtHR explicitly 
distinguishes and justifies its own approach using established techniques of interpretation. 
5. Conclusion 
 
The ECtHR explicitly accepts two tests for the extraterritorial application of the ECHR under 
Article 1 of the ECHR: the control over an individual test and the control over a territory test. 
The ECtHR in Jaloud v Netherlands could be interpreted as adopting a different test of 
jurisdiction under Article 1: an attribution test. It has been argued here that this would not be 
the first time that the ECtHR has adopted an attribution test in order to establish Article 1 
jurisdiction. In Ilascu and Catan the ECtHR relied on attributing the actions of the MRT to 
Russia in order to hold Russia responsible for the rights violations committed by the MRT. 
Furthermore, this approach does not give rise to an insurmountable conflict with international 
law. Article 2 of the ASR does not necessarily preclude the conflation of attribution and 
Article 1 jurisdiction. Whether it provides any guidance on the relationship between 
jurisdiction and attribution in international human rights treaties is inconclusive. Furthermore, 
the fact that the standard of control required under international law for attributing the actions 
of non-state entities to states is higher than in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is not, in and of 
itself, a reason for denying conflation of attribution with jurisdiction. One way in which the 
ECtHR can justify its distinct practice is by reference to its character as a regional 
international human rights treaty. If Article 1 jurisdiction is conflated with attribution, then it 
signals a move towards the diminishing significance of territory as a barrier to accountability 
under the ECHR. The arbitrary tests for determining when the ECHR is applicable abroad - 
the control over an individual or control over a territory tests – are overlooked, and the 
question becomes: who should be held responsible? 
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